



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

partition of belief? For the reason, namely, that a mere actionless object "as such" no more exists than does a contentless "act" or "process" of belief "as such."

The immediate source, then, of the troubles above recounted lies in the partition of belief into a contentless "subjective" "mental" act on the one hand and an actionless content or "object" on the other. And is not this a case of the sort of abstraction that has kept the "epistemological problem" going so long? What, when, or where is there just an "act" or "process" as such? Is there a "process" of brickmaking without bricks, of talking without language, of hearing without sounds?

No doubt the statement that truth and falsity are "attributes of the real and the unreal as possible objects of belief," taken out of its context might well be used to turn the edge of the above charge of vicious partition. But also, there can be no doubt that the point of the argument of neo-realism as a whole is to show that "true" and "false" are qualifications of the "objects" as distinguished from and wholly independent of the "act" of belief which is made a merely "psychological" and "subjective" affair.

A. W. MOORE.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

DISCUSSION

THE THEORY OF INDEPENDENCE—ONCE MORE

READING Dr. Isaak Husik's criticism¹ of Professor Perry's conception of independence,² I have yielded to the temptation, hitherto successfully resisted, to venture a passing word of my own upon this subject. I say "venture" because in each case in which I have been tempted to discuss matters with the new realism I have discovered that the point which seemed to me central and decisive was barred off and labeled "Not for Discussion"—either because it represented a universal, and therefore indisputable, assumption; or a groundless assumption; or a definitive pronouncement of science; or a fundamental principle of logic; or a principle embodied once for all in the "Platform," such as the externality of relations; or, as in the case before us, because "it introduces practical and dynamic considerations which are more confusing than clarifying." I fear, then, that no other course is open but to lay hands boldly and rudely upon the forbidden consideration and insist upon introducing it.

¹ "Theory of Independence," this JOURNAL, Vol. X., page 347.

² Essay on "The Meaning of Independence" in "The New Realism," New York, 1912.

Professor Perry defines independence by assembling the empirically discoverable cases of dependence and making independence consist in absence from the list. In this sense of "non-dependence," the object is independent of its being known; this, of course, being the point of the definition. Dr. Husik questions the validity of the method as well as the completeness of the list. My own criticism is to add that, precisely because he has rejected the "practical and dynamic considerations," Mr. Perry has omitted a case of independence which is not only important but perhaps fundamental, namely, personal independence.

First, however, I must enter the objection that "independence" is not the simple equivalent of "non-dependence" any more than "immoral" is the equivalent of "non-moral." To say that the philosophy of Berkeley's "Principles" is not moral philosophy is not necessarily to condemn it. Mr. Perry admits that independence is not absence of relation, but absence of some particular relation of "dependence." In fact, his problem is to define independence-in-relation. But the absence of a *particular* relation is as positive and particular a fact as the presence of that relation. In a word, then, we must distinguish between the absence of dependence and the opposite of dependence. Absence of dependence may stand only for irrelevance and mean that the relation of *A* to *B* is a relation neither of dependence nor of its opposite.

That the distinction is an important one we may now see by turning to the rejected "practical and dynamic considerations" and studying the sort of dependence or independence to be found between man and man. It is here that we find our case of personal independence. And here we see that independence, so far from being a case of mere non-dependence, is, as compared with personal dependence, if anything the more positive fact. So far as I can see, this sort of independence (or dependence) is nowhere accounted for in Mr. Perry's list; and it is hard to explain the absence of so conspicuous a case of independence except by the prepossession that persons are not to be counted among the reals. Personal independence implies, however, equally with personal dependence, a relation of personal interest—a personal relation. It means something to assert my independence of my colleagues, of my parents, or of my wife, but nothing whatever to assert my independence of the Emperor of China. Personal independence implies a purpose to be attained, and, at the same time, in the attainment of this purpose, a relation to some other person (or it may be an inanimate object) whom I am bound to consider. Independence is achieved in the attainment of that purpose *in this relation*. Thus we may say that

¹ "Theory of Independence," this JOURNAL, Vol. X., page 347.

Mrs. A. is dependent upon Mr. A. for the use of a motor-car, but not if she has no desire to use a motor-car. In this case neither "dependence" nor "independence" is relevant to the situation. Suppose that Mrs. A., having a desire to use the car, nevertheless proudly conquers her desire; in a measure she becomes independent. Suppose that she conquers the objections of Mr. A. and obtains a free use of the car by a valid guarantee to respect his convenience; this is a more positive independence. Suppose, however, that her father gives her a car; she is still independent, but only because she is a wife. This is usually what we mean when we say that the wife has "an independent income"—independent, of course, of her husband; for, in relation to other persons, most wives have an independent income.

When, therefore, I assert my independence of you, I mean, not that you have no interest for me—this is belied by the fact of my assertion—but that whatever you may do to me or say to or of me, I shall be able to meet you with an act of my own which, with full consideration of what you say or do, will give me what I want. This is the positive meaning of the relation in which what you do "makes no difference." What you do does indeed make a difference; but let me know what you will do, and I will realize my ends (not to speak of yours as well) in an action molded to suit. In this sense it is clear that independence implies creative intelligence and will. If Mrs. A. has no will of her own, no amount of private income will make her independent. If she is lacking in intelligence and confronts every proposition from Mr. A. with blind opposition, she creates difficulties which make her more than ever dependent. Thus, independence is the property of a being *qua* self-conscious and intelligent. B. needs a step-ladder, but finds only a table and a chair. Realism would say that a step-ladder is a step-ladder and a chair a chair; and therefore that B. is strictly dependent. But by an act of intelligence B. makes a step-ladder out of a chair-upon-a-table and thus secures his independence of the makers of step-ladders, tables, and chairs.

I shall not attempt in this passing comment to develop the bearing of this kind of independence upon the kinds enumerated by Mr. Perry. My question would be whether this would not turn out to be the only kind of independence which satisfies the demand of independence-in-relation. Mr. Perry points out that the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is not dependent upon the other sides except as the line in question is to be regarded as an hypotenuse. My question would be how it could ever be regarded as an hypotenuse except as it wanted to be, or some one wanted it to be, so regarded. And the same question applies to cause and effect. The effect depends

upon the cause *if you desire the effect*. Otherwise—well, otherwise I, for one, am at a loss to find anything to say; but it seems to me that a neo-realist is limited to the statement that the effect *follows* the cause. In brief, then, my question would be whether any case of dependence whatever will not imply a personal point of view which is foreign to a realistic, at least a neo-realistic, world.

My present purpose, however, is to point out that in ignoring the case of personal independence Mr. Perry, though a foe to epistemology, follows a curiously blind tradition of epistemological theory. The history of epistemology, at least of English epistemology, might be written as “The History of the Knower and his Chair.” Apparently, the chair (though sometimes the table) is the epistemologist’s sole piece, not only of household furniture, but of mental furniture. Yet presumably the epistemologist is not without friends, whom he knows, and by whom also he is known. His friends never appear, however, in any analysis of knowing. The traditional and universal basis of discussion is the relation of a knower to an inanimate and unknowing known. This determines the type of knowing and the final theory of knowledge. The case of knowing a fellow-knower appears, if it appears at all, only as a curiously complicated, but not really enlightening, case of knowing, to be relegated to an appendix. It is quietly assumed that the complications introduced by the fact of knowing an object by which you can at the same time be known would in no wise compel a revision or a new choice of type.

I call this a curiously blind tradition; for when we look at the matter squarely we can see no reason why the case of knowing your fellow-knower should not be at least as genuine, and therefore as typical, a case of knowing as the case of knowing the chair; and if it should turn out that you know your fellow-knower better than you know the chair, the case would be more illuminating and more instructive as regards the nature of knowledge—the position of the typical and the typified would then be reversed. There appears to be no reason for dwelling upon the case of the chair except that it is simpler—which means that it is easier to talk about.

The consequences of reversing the type of the knowledge-relation would be too long a story for the present writing and I shall confine myself to two suggestions. First, I will suggest that that stupefying question, *Is there an external world?* which has made so much of our modern philosophy stale, flat, and unprofitable—on this point I can weep with the new realists—that question would never arise. When Berkeley evolves the formula, *esse est percipi*, he is thinking exclusively of the chair, or of “the table I write on.” When he comes to his fellow-knower he completely changes his ground. Idealism stands now, not for the doctrine that the being of things is their

being known—by another—but for the impossibility of attributing being to “inert matter.” It is not difficult to see why the ground is changed. One may easily enough make the *esse* of the chair a mere *percipi* because the chair can not protest. If I make my fellow-knower merely an idea in my mind, he, even as idea, will retort by making me an idea in his mind. Self-preservation demands, then, that I shall grant him the courtesy of an independent existence; but no such courtesy can be enforced by the chair. It seems safe to say, then, that if epistemological analysis had been concentrated upon the process of knowing objects which, like our fellow-men, can not only be known, but can know and reply, subjective idealism would never have been heard of.

My second suggestion is the question whether, if the knowing of the fellow-knower were regarded as the typical case of knowledge, we should face a flat disjunction between idealism and realism. Idealism holds (at least) that an object is characterized—acquires a real quality and character—in being known. Realism holds that the character of the object is independent of its being known; though Mr. Perry makes the dangerous admission that in becoming known it may acquire a new character. Now, to common-sense observation the character of the chair is unrelated to its being known. This observation is to my mind superficial, but it is plausible and for purposes of argument may be allowed to pass. In the case of your fellow-man the statement is not even plausible. What a man is, is strictly relevant to the relation in which you know him—and more strictly relevant to the extent that the relation is clearly defined. It is a common remark that a man may present very “different sides of his character” to his family and to his employees. But any side of character implies a relation to some sort of “other,” be it man or nature. To be a politician one requires a political situation; to express, or even to have, a taste in music, a musical world. What “he” would be apart from any situation, we can not conceive; a man without an environment would have nothing to say and no side of character to express. And yet, all the while, as a knowing being, he is, as we have seen, an independent being. His character and his opinions, though relevant to his situation, are yet, so far as they are formed self-consciously—and thus real character and real opinions—not the reflection of his situation, but the expression of independent judgment and choice. Thus your human object of knowledge is both an independent being and a being whose character is constituted in the process of being known.

May it not turn out, then, that this is just the independent being for which the realistic metaphysics, old and new alike, has been seeking? The new realism, nothing if not scientific, will of course re-

sent the suggestion as superstitious. And I quite appreciate the difficulty of erecting upon this basis a detailed logic of science. In the meantime it may be well to reflect upon the possible implications of Bacon's *natura parendo vincitur* and once more recall the case of the chair, the table, and the step-ladder. By constituting the chair upon the table into a step-ladder I win a certain independence, not only of the intentions of those who made these things, but of the general constitution of nature. Upon what ground may you deny that the chair upon the table is really a step-ladder? Yet no laws of nature are broken; in other words, nature maintains her independence. I believe that the relations typified in this crude illustration may be read far into the general process of scientific construction.

WARNER FITE.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Interpretation of Dreams. SIGMUND FREUD. Translated from the third German edition by A. A. BRILL. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. xii + 510.

"*Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.*" No more exquisite motto could have been discovered for the book whose translation lies before us. For it is the underlying principle of Freud's theory that the dream is the product of important mental trends which, owing to their unpleasant character, are unable to reach the higher levels of consciousness in their true forms; but with the partial suspension of psychic "censorship" during sleep, they may then come into consciousness, subject to certain mechanisms of distortion, in the rôle of dreams.

Within the short interval of its publication, it was not to be expected that the third edition should show very marked differences from the second, nor does it, though it is far from a mere reprinting. The literary excellence of the original is known to many of us, and it is unfortunate that the translator should not combine his accurate knowledge of the material with the ability to preserve better the former quality. One must take the charitable view that what is very well worth doing, may be worth doing not so very well; there are some lapses, however, that careful editorship should have guarded against.

The simple statement that the dream is the fulfilment of a wish is not of itself a very debatable proposition. For it must be apparent that from a dynamic standpoint all psychobiological activity may be regarded as the expression of organic trends, including the processes to which psychoanalysis has not altogether wisely applied the term *wish*. The essential issue is not raised until we ask the question "what wish," and attempt to demonstrate genetic relationship between the manifest content of the dream and certain latent dream thoughts that it is supposed to symbolize.

The theory rests upon the postulate that ideas which come up in free